Anlässlich der
Vorstellung des jährlichen Rankings am 22. Januar 2015 in Berlin
Prof. R. Andreas Kraemer
Direktor, Ecologic Institut – www.ecologic.eu
Visiting Assistant & Adjunct Professor, Duke University
"Alle Jahre wieder", so könnte man sagen, "wird mit vielen
Tausend Mitwirkenden ein globales Ranking der Think Tanks erstellt, und der
Sieger ist immer die Brookings Institution aus den USA, und Chatham House aus
London wird Europameister". Auch im Jahre 2014 war es wieder so –
und das ist durchaus verdient.
Das Think Tank Ranking gab es erstmals für das Jahr 2006 und nun zum 8. Mal in
Folge. Jedes Jahr gibt es Verbesserungen in der Methode, neue Kategorien,
besser geographische Zuschnitte, und einen wachsenden und immer kompetenteren
Expertenpool, der am Ranking mitwirkt.
Jetzt waren es über Mitarbeiter von 6681 Think Tanks und über 9000
Einzelpersonen, die nicht in Think Tanks arbeiten, zusammen insgesamt über
21.500 Personen, die zur Mitwirkung eingeladen wurden.
Das Ranking ist ein "offenes und demokratisches Verfahren"; der
Verantwortliche, Prof. Dr. James McGann von der Universität von Pennsylvania,
hält nichts von Bewertungen in kleinen Gremien hinter verschlossenen Türen und
strebt eine weltweite Beteiligung an. So gab es über 3500 Wissenschaftler,
Journalisten, politischen Entscheider, Direktoren und Mitarbeiterinnen oder
Mitarbeiter der vielen Think Tanks, Förderer und Sponsoren, die bei der
Nominierung und den Abstimmungen mitgewirkt haben, und noch einmal über 1950
Experten für Regionen oder Themengebiete, welche das Ranking geprüft und seine
Qualität gesichert haben. In einer Art "Crowd-Sourcing"
kontrollieren sie die Arbeitsschritte, prüfen Plausibilität und identifizieren
so Fehler, die sich einschleichen können.
Auch die (etwa 30-40) Forschungspraktikanten im Think Tanks and Civil Societies
Program (TTCSP) an der Universität von Pennsylvania sind wichtig; das Ranking
hat nur ein kleines Budget und ist auf die Hilfe von zahlreichen Studenten
angewiesen.
Das TTCS-Programm der Universität von Pennsylvania hat Aktivitäten in knapp 100
Ländern und begleitet jetzt den Aufbau von regionalen und globalen sowie
thematischen Think-Tank-Netzwerken als Schritt zu dauerhaften
Partnerschaften. Die hier geschaffenen weltweiten Verbindungen helfen
nicht nur bei der Stärkung und Professionalisierung von Think Tanks sondern
auch bei der Datensammlung und Einwerbung von MItwirkenden für das Ranking.
Über die Jahre gab es eine Reihe von Verfeinerung in der Methode, in den
technischen, vor allem datentechnischen Grundlagen sowie in den geographischen,
thematischen und sonstigen Kategorien. Im 2014er Ranking waren dies vor allem:
• Die Kategorie "Gesundheit" wurde aufgeteilt in
"internationale" und "nationale" Gesundheitspolitik; auch eine
Reaktion auf die Ebola-Krise
• Eine Reihe von geographischen Zuweisungen wurde geklärt; Russland in letzter Entscheidung Europa zugeordnet
Weitere Schwachstellen bestehen und werden nach und nach angegangen:
• Einige Regionen sind unterrepräsentiert (auch weil es dort
weniger Think Tanks gibt)
• Besonders USA aber Nordamerika insgesamt und Europa sind
überrepräsentiert
• Möglicher "Bias" (Verzerrungen, die trotz der
breiten Teilnehmerbasis bestehen)
• Technische Probleme und Umständlichkeit (die mit der Zeit
abgebaut werden)
Deutsche Think Tanks im Rankingergebnis 2014
Bezogen auf die im Vergleich zum Vorjahr unveränderte Zahl von 194 Think Tanks liegt Deutschland auf dem 4. Platz
hinter den USA, China und Grossbritannien; Indien ist um einen Platz
zurückgefallen und liegt nun auf dem 5. Platz, gefolgt von Frankreich. Dieser 4. Platz ist Ausdruck der politischen Offenheit und Meinungsvielfalt
hierzulande. Herausragend ist die Stellung der politischen Stiftungen,
auch aufgrund ihrer internationalen Engagements. Diese belegen in der
entsprechenden Kategorie die Plätze 1-3, 6, 8, und 20; sie sind in vielen
Kategorien gut vertreten.
Erste Plätze werden auch belegt von
• Max-Planck Institut in der Kategorie "Wissenschaft und
Technologie"
• Transparency International in "Transparenz und gute
Regierungsführung"
• Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz in der Kategorie
"Think-Tank-Konferenz"
• Konrad-Adenauer
Stiftung und Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in
"Think-Tank-Netzwerke"
Zahlreich "im Feld gut vertreten" sind deutsche Think Tanks besonders in
den Kategorien:
• Weltweit
• West-Europa
• Wirtschaftspolitik
• Umwelt
• Think-Tank-Netzwerke
• Innovative Ideen
• Beste Themen-Kampagne
• Einfluss auf Politik
• Gewinnorientierte Think Tanks
Gar nicht vertreten sind deutsche Think Tanks in anderen Regionen der Welt sowie in den thematischen Kategorien:
• Bildung; was eine Ländersache ist und hierzulande hauptsächlich auf Deutsch diskutiert wird, weswegen die fehlende
internationale Ausstrahlung verständlich ist
• Energie & Rohstoffe; was angesichts von Energiewende
und Rohstoffsicherungsinteressen der deutschen Industrie erstaunlich ist. Die Energiewende ist ein Quell für "Soft Power" für Deutschland in aller Welt, aber die Strahlkraft des Themas wird offenbar nicht mit Think Tanks in Verbindung gebracht
• Gesundheit; was angesichts der rein nationalen Diskussion trotz der Bedeutung Deutschlands als
Leitmarkt der Gesundheitsindustrie nachvollziehbar und dennoch bedauerlich ist
Neben den politischen Stiftungen sind weitere deutsche Think Tanks öfters
gerankt:
• Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
• Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)
• Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
• IfW Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel
• IfO Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (auch CESifo)
• Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin)
• Transparency International
• Ecologic Institut
• Bertelsmann Stiftung
• Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• Potsdam-Institut für Klimafolgenforschung (PIK)
Bei der Betrachtung des Ranking im Ganzen entsteht der Eindruck, dass
diejenigen Think Tanks im Vergleich besser abschneiden, die
• auch oder vorwiegend in englischer Sprache publizieren, was
auch den Einfluss stärkt,
• außerhalb des eigenen Landes oder in internationalen
Netzwerken präsent sind,
• kurze Namen haben und dabei auf Sonderzeichen verzichten,
und vor allem
• konsistent eine unverwechselbare englische
Namensentsprechung führen ("Branding").
Hier sind deutsche Think Tanks im Schnitt besser als andere in
nicht-englisch-sprachigen Ländern, aber sie können sicher noch mehr tun.
Das Ranking gibt Ansporn dazu.
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Thursday, December 25, 2014
Why Germany Has No Need for North-to-South Power Lines
Melissa Eddy, writing in the New York Times on Christmas Eve 2014, fails to explain why "Germans Balk at Plan for Wind Power Lines" to bring wind power from the North to the power-hungry South:
The
North-to-South transmission lines are not needed; they are a waste of
money, designed to increase the cost of the Energiewende and thus do
discredit it, and to split the environmental community in various ways.
Here is why:
The promoters of these North-to-South "Electricity Autobahns" have you believe that Germany has good wind only offshore in the North, and faces the risk of black-out in the South, when the last nuclear power plants go cold at the end of 2022. (If they go cold; these folks also float the idea of "extending the running time of nuclear power plants beyond 2022" whenever they have a chance.) Their map shows Germany as an island. Look at a map of the European power grid and you understand what nonsense has been planted in the general public‘s and many a politician‘s mind. (On the side: One of the proposed transmission lines was designed to bring lignite power from the East into the South. It was sold as "necessary for the Energiewende" but was in fact the exact opposite.)
The capacity of the existing North-to-South transmission lines is fully sufficient in the (daily) average. More demand management and storage in the South would improve capacity utilisation. Many large industrial power users have ways to become "swing consumers" and reduce their demand when power prices are high. The innovative businesses in Germany‘s South could benefit from even lower average power prices if they put their mind to it. Increasingly inexpensive storage, built up incrementally and flexibly in the South close to demand centers, is way more economical than large-scale and indivisible, capital-intensive, medium-term investment in high-voltage transmission lines, which create strong economic and technical path-dependencies. The German auto industry, which is strong in the South, could take a lead here.
There is wind also in Germany‘s South. Instead of putting turbines into the corrosive marine environment of the North and Baltic Seas, on muddy ground in 40m of water‘s depth in large off-shore parks that need to be connected to the grid in what are in effect vulnerable choke points, the turbines could rise above the forest canopies on the high plains and ridges of Southern Germany. The project sizes and risks, costs of grid connection and system integration would be way lower than with off-shore wind power.
Germany still has a massive problem with atomic power from France, which all too often clogs up the German grid in the West and South-West, including the North-to-South lines, on its way to Switzerland and Italy. It would be way quicker and cheaper to build an underwater cable from Marseille to Rome than to expand grid capacity in Germany just so that it can accommodate that atomic power.
The solution is Tunur, a company that wants to bring 24h solar power from Tunesia via an underwater cable to Italy (near Rome) and thus into the integrated European power market. Tunur power could replace the power currently imported into Italy from the North and reverse the flow across the Alps. Tunur‘s power is already sold in the UK, so the project is fully financed; it would not cost Germany a cent, just a vote for accelerating this private project as part of the 315bn Euro investment stimulus package.
Freeing up the German grid would also help reduce stress with Eastern neighbours Poland and the Czech Republic as "loop flows" would be reduced. A direct transmission line from Germany to the UK, again as part of the 315bn package, would facilitate regional grid integration and reduce France‘s ability to way-lay Tunur‘s power on the way to its customers. (Excuse me for the simplistic description of power flows across Europe and the Mediterranean.)
As a whole, the concept of building all these (8300km of) new power lines in Germany is part of a framing of the Energiewende that focuses on supply-sided expansion of large-scale and distant-from-demand renewable energy, denigrates the potential of more distributed generation and storage in a smart grid that would also enable demand flexibility to help reduce total system cost. Tennet, the transmission grid operator in question here, operates a regulated "cost-plus-margin" business and has an interest in making expensive investments for a regulated rate of return way higher than the current cost of capital.
Melissa Eddy is normally relatively knowledgeable and scrupulous in her reporting, but a number of blatant falsehoods give away some presumably heavy-handed editorial guidance. Just to examples to prove this point: 1) The nuclear phase-out was agreed in 2000; it didn‘t need Fukushima. 2) Germany has record low power prices for businesses, the larger the user, the lower the price. No-one in German industry worries about any "growing cost" of the Energiewende, because a) the Energiewende costs only a little more than the business-as-usual maintenance of the risky and dirty power supply system that is now being replaced, and b) industry does not pay for the policy but gets all the benefit (in the form of very cheap power in a very reliable grid).
----------------
Related post:
European Energy Policy after the Crimean Crisis: Focus on Flexibility
The promoters of these North-to-South "Electricity Autobahns" have you believe that Germany has good wind only offshore in the North, and faces the risk of black-out in the South, when the last nuclear power plants go cold at the end of 2022. (If they go cold; these folks also float the idea of "extending the running time of nuclear power plants beyond 2022" whenever they have a chance.) Their map shows Germany as an island. Look at a map of the European power grid and you understand what nonsense has been planted in the general public‘s and many a politician‘s mind. (On the side: One of the proposed transmission lines was designed to bring lignite power from the East into the South. It was sold as "necessary for the Energiewende" but was in fact the exact opposite.)
The capacity of the existing North-to-South transmission lines is fully sufficient in the (daily) average. More demand management and storage in the South would improve capacity utilisation. Many large industrial power users have ways to become "swing consumers" and reduce their demand when power prices are high. The innovative businesses in Germany‘s South could benefit from even lower average power prices if they put their mind to it. Increasingly inexpensive storage, built up incrementally and flexibly in the South close to demand centers, is way more economical than large-scale and indivisible, capital-intensive, medium-term investment in high-voltage transmission lines, which create strong economic and technical path-dependencies. The German auto industry, which is strong in the South, could take a lead here.
There is wind also in Germany‘s South. Instead of putting turbines into the corrosive marine environment of the North and Baltic Seas, on muddy ground in 40m of water‘s depth in large off-shore parks that need to be connected to the grid in what are in effect vulnerable choke points, the turbines could rise above the forest canopies on the high plains and ridges of Southern Germany. The project sizes and risks, costs of grid connection and system integration would be way lower than with off-shore wind power.
Germany still has a massive problem with atomic power from France, which all too often clogs up the German grid in the West and South-West, including the North-to-South lines, on its way to Switzerland and Italy. It would be way quicker and cheaper to build an underwater cable from Marseille to Rome than to expand grid capacity in Germany just so that it can accommodate that atomic power.
The solution is Tunur, a company that wants to bring 24h solar power from Tunesia via an underwater cable to Italy (near Rome) and thus into the integrated European power market. Tunur power could replace the power currently imported into Italy from the North and reverse the flow across the Alps. Tunur‘s power is already sold in the UK, so the project is fully financed; it would not cost Germany a cent, just a vote for accelerating this private project as part of the 315bn Euro investment stimulus package.
Freeing up the German grid would also help reduce stress with Eastern neighbours Poland and the Czech Republic as "loop flows" would be reduced. A direct transmission line from Germany to the UK, again as part of the 315bn package, would facilitate regional grid integration and reduce France‘s ability to way-lay Tunur‘s power on the way to its customers. (Excuse me for the simplistic description of power flows across Europe and the Mediterranean.)
As a whole, the concept of building all these (8300km of) new power lines in Germany is part of a framing of the Energiewende that focuses on supply-sided expansion of large-scale and distant-from-demand renewable energy, denigrates the potential of more distributed generation and storage in a smart grid that would also enable demand flexibility to help reduce total system cost. Tennet, the transmission grid operator in question here, operates a regulated "cost-plus-margin" business and has an interest in making expensive investments for a regulated rate of return way higher than the current cost of capital.
Melissa Eddy is normally relatively knowledgeable and scrupulous in her reporting, but a number of blatant falsehoods give away some presumably heavy-handed editorial guidance. Just to examples to prove this point: 1) The nuclear phase-out was agreed in 2000; it didn‘t need Fukushima. 2) Germany has record low power prices for businesses, the larger the user, the lower the price. No-one in German industry worries about any "growing cost" of the Energiewende, because a) the Energiewende costs only a little more than the business-as-usual maintenance of the risky and dirty power supply system that is now being replaced, and b) industry does not pay for the policy but gets all the benefit (in the form of very cheap power in a very reliable grid).
----------------
Related post:
European Energy Policy after the Crimean Crisis: Focus on Flexibility
Tuesday, October 7, 2014
Chlorchemie – The Bad Business of Halogenated Organic Substances
This post is derived from a fact sheet for ÖkoVision, an investment fund
or mutual trust investing in companies that, with their policies, business
model, processes, products and services, are likely to succeed in an equitable
and sustainable future industrial society and market economy.
Companies are not compatible with ÖkoVision if they produce, promote, trade, distribute, use (in significant
quantities), or enable or promote the manufacture, trade, or use of halogenated
organic substances.
As a principle, ÖkoVision
does not invest in such companies. The
criterion is very important but not absolute, and attenuating circumstances are
considered in judging businesses (see below for detail).
The criterion is about
organic chemical substances or compounds, in which one halogen atom or several
same or different halogen atoms form direct bonds with carbon. Of concern are mass products of the chemical
industry, such as PVC or halogenated solvents, and specialized chemicals, such
as pesticides or biocides. The criterion
does not apply to pharmaceutical and
other substances that produce large benefits with the use of small quantities,
and for which no practical substitutes exist.
Reasoning:
In chlorine chemistry ("Chlorchemie")
or more widely "halogen-organic chemistry", substances are produced
or used, in which a chemical bond exists between halogen atoms – fluorine,
chlorine, bromine, or iodine – and carbon atoms. All substances with a halogen-carbon bond
and/or their biochemical or physical metabolites and degradation products are
highly toxic, eco-toxic, carcinogenic, teratogenic, act as greenhouse gases and
aggravate climate change and/or are damaging to the Earth‘s protective ozone
layer.
While some substances can
be used in small quantities in medicine, where the benefits for humans outweigh
the costs and damages, most such substances are so harmful in their
manufacture, use, and disposal that cost-benefit assessments should stop their
production, sale and trade. Even if some
halogenated organic substances are not hazardous per se, they become so when
they react or degrade, for instance when incinerated, exposed to light or natural
ultraviolet rays (in the stratosphere).
The production of halogenated organic substances is hazardous; notorious
large accidents in the chemical industry, such as at Bhopal, Schweizerhalle
(Sandoz), or Toulouse, involve, as a rule, this class of chemicals. Chlorine chemistry is an obstacle to the
development of a sustainable and ethical industrial society and market economy.
Chemical Background:
Halogens, the elements
"born from salt" or "forming salt", form a group in
chemistry‘s periodic table: Fluorine (F – no. 9 in periodic table), chlorine
(Cl – 17), bromine (Br – 35) and iodine (I – 53)[1].
Their high chemical bond
energy (or electronegativity or redox potential) is the key characteristic of
halogens. Fluorine has the highest chemical
bond energy of all elements[2], and bond
energy declines within the group from fluorine to iodine. Each atom is lacking one electron in its
outermost shell; they strongly seek to gain one electron and complete that
shell (which charges them negatively or reduces them). This characteristic makes elemental halogens
extremely reactive; they can break up many chemical compounds and form new ones
with particular properties of concern.
Some of the newly formed compounds are themselves very stable, while
others are not.
Chemical Policy Background:
"Chlorchemie" symbolises
a chemical policy controversy, at the heart of which are the manufacture, use,
recycling (or better "down-cycling") and the (highly problematical)
disposal of polyvinylchloride (PVC) and other mass or bulk products of the
chlorine chemical industry. Ozone-depleting
chlorinated or halogenated hydrocarbons are also part of the controversy. There are also a range of substances for
special purposes as industrial chemicals or, for instance, as insecticides or
fungicides.
It is known since 1885/1890
how pure chlorine on the one side and on the other potassium or sodium hydroxide
can be produced using electrical energy (chloralkali electrolysis), where chlorine
and potassium viz. sodium are always produced in fixed proportion (combined
production). The objective was (and to a
degree still is) the production of potassium and sodium; chlorine emerges as a
dangerous by-product (or waste), which has to be chemically bonded and
stabilised before it could be disposed of (in landfills). This was done by bonding of chlorine as
chloroethene or vinyl chloride (C2H3Cl), which was then
used to synthesise long-chained polyvinylchloride (PVC [C2H3Cl]n)
for landfilling. PVC is still quite
unstable, and in its decay releases the aggressive and corrosive chlorine. For this reason, PVC was further stabilised
with additives such as cadmium, and through the addition of plasticisers, such
as a partly endocrine phthalates, was given properties that allowed PVC to be
sold as a product.
The generation of combined
products and by-products is a common feature of the chemical industry. Not all such products can be put to good use.
Often the exact composition of mixtures
of such products is not known, and the separation of mixtures would be too
cumbersome and expensive. In such cases,
initially in the interest of plant safety, mixtures with unknown or uncertain
composition and characteristics were "fully chlorinated" or
"fully halogenated" and thus homogenised. This method of waste treatment produces large
quantities of mostly short-chained halogenated alkanes[3], the
fluoro-chloro-hydrocarbons (CFC), which have known properties and could be
marketed as solvents, cooling agents, or propellants for spray cans, for
instance. Fully halogenated hydrocarbons
are chemically very stable, no longer reactive, and thus very durable. However, they rise to the stratosphere where
they decay under the exposure to high-energy radiation from space and then
damage the Earth‘s stratospheric ozone layer that protects life from the
radiation.
Chlorine chemistry is a
history of converting hazardous waste into hazardous yet marketable products.
Another aspect drives the
continuing chemical policy controversy in addition to the history and the
dangerous properties of the products of the chlorine chemical industry: The production of chlorine and other halogens
as feed-stock for the halogen-organic chemical industry requires enormous
quantities of electrical energy. For
this reason, chloralkali electrolysis plants and nuclear power plants are found
next to one another, with the chemical industry benefitting more or less
directly from the subsidies and privileges given to nuclear power plants.
The "Dirty Dozen" and the "Nasty
Nine":
Chlorine and other halogens
are prominent also in the "Dirty Dozen" and "Nasty Nine"
regulated (or banned) by the Stockholm Convention.
These are "persistent organic pollutants" or "POPs", namely
dangerous insecticides, a fungicide, industrial chemicals and pollutants from
combustion plants.
What this is not about:
The chemical bonds between
halogens and carbon are at the core.
Chemical bonds with other elements of the carbon group or metals are not
relevant here. Not part of the
controversy and thus not in focus here are inorganic halogen bonds, mostly
salts. Sodium chloride (NaCl) is cooking
salt and on everyone‘s lips, and the halogens are important for human health
(fluorine for teeth, iodine for the thyroid gland, …). Industry lobbyists like to stress that
"chlorine is not dangerous", as it is part of food. The argument is designed to distract from the
dangers cause by halogen-organic compounds.
Halogens also form bonds
with other elements that are similar to carbon.
An example is silicon, and silicon chloride plays a role in
semiconductors and the production of solar panels. Although such compounds can be problematic,
they are not part of the chlorine chemistry controversy.
[1] There
is also the rare, radioactive astatine (At – 85) and the artificial or man-made
and highly unstable ununseptium (Uus – 117).
These are without practical relevance here.
[2] As a
consequence, no other chemical element can break the chemical bonds formed by fluorine,
and physical energy in the form of electricity must be used to form pure fluorine
(F2); producing meaningful quantities of pure halogens requires
energy-intensive technical processes at industrial scale.
[3] Alkanes are chains of carbon atoms, which in their basic
form are surrounded only by hydrogen (hydrocarbons); methane (CH4)
and ethane (C2H6) are most relevant here.
Wednesday, August 6, 2014
Denver Nicks with Serious Falsehoods about Germany‘s Energiewende in Time
Denver Nicks wrote this article in Time! It must be a a record for serious falsehoods in such a short piece.
It is common for English-language journalists to misrepresent facts and reasons of the energy transformation currently being undertaken in Germany. Many of them cannot read German and recycle material provided to them in English. They are easy victims of the hired pens of the incumbent utilities, and the coal and nuclear lobbies. Denver Nicks appears to be one of them.
Here are my short corrections on the three gravest falsehoods in that article:
1) The Energiewende is not "state-subsidized"; there have been no subsidies for the last 10 years or so. The feed-in tariff does not involve government money, and is therefore not a subsidy. In fact, the Energiewende results in a significant increase in tax revenue (and social security contributions): The Energiewende policy is fiscally positive, and as such should be replicated by Euro countries with high deficits and debts.
2) Energy prices (meaning power prices) are not high and not rising in Germany. In fact, prices on the power exchanges are at record lows, still trending down, and any industrial power user with enough wits can now lock in those low prices until the end of 2017. Anyone from industry complaining about high power prices is either a liar or has been duped by utilities and power traders.
3) The "post-Fukushima draw-down of nuclear power" has not led to an increase in the use of coal. Coal use and emissions went up in 2012 and 2013, but no nuclear plants were shut in those years. (The last shut-down was immediately after Fukushima in 2011; the next shut down is scheduled for the end of 2016.) There are reasons for an increase in coal use, all of them bad and avoidable, but the nuclear phase-out is not one of them.
Friday, May 2, 2014
New York Times Editorial Board Draws the Wrong Lessons after Chernobyl
On 1 May 2014, an overtly pro-nuclear op-ed was published by The New York Times. It is not just another run-of-the-mill op-ed, this is the New York Times Editorial Board itself, with all its majesty. Collectively, they come out in favor of nuclear power every once in a while, and the mind boggles with speculation what drives them to do it.
There is, as usual, some nonsense about Germany, which I won‘t bother to address here.
The main message concerns the US; it is a plea to keep the fleet of US nuclear power plants running, against the economic interests of the operators. (Closure decisions in the US are taken by operators.)
Change the economics? Stop fracking by giving it equal treatment with other activities under environmental legislation, and tax oil and gas extraction? Unlikely in the present-day US. Stop the expansion of renewable power? The op-ed argues against it, and it would be futile given the downward cost-curves of solar, wind, and likely storage, too. Subsidize nuclear power even more? That must be the plan, probably by further increasing the share of utility revenue from capacity payments, which are already high in the US.
Some US nuclear power plants are shut because they are simply in the wrong location to compete. More importantly, with age they become more expensive to run, some need repairs some need retrofits, for some even routine refueling may no longer make economic sense.
The consequences of serious nuclear accidents are too large to insure, and governments have colluded through legal conventions to stop victims from suing for compensation. Serious accidents are also more frequent that is usually admitted; there was about one core-melt incident every 5 years since the accident in Chalk River, Ontario, in 1952.
The New York Times Editorial Board asks the nation to "extend and pretend", extend operations and pretend it makes economic sense. It also asks the world to "delay and pray", to delay true reckoning of the risks of nuclear power, and pray that no more serious accidents will happen.
There is, as usual, some nonsense about Germany, which I won‘t bother to address here.
The main message concerns the US; it is a plea to keep the fleet of US nuclear power plants running, against the economic interests of the operators. (Closure decisions in the US are taken by operators.)
Change the economics? Stop fracking by giving it equal treatment with other activities under environmental legislation, and tax oil and gas extraction? Unlikely in the present-day US. Stop the expansion of renewable power? The op-ed argues against it, and it would be futile given the downward cost-curves of solar, wind, and likely storage, too. Subsidize nuclear power even more? That must be the plan, probably by further increasing the share of utility revenue from capacity payments, which are already high in the US.
Some US nuclear power plants are shut because they are simply in the wrong location to compete. More importantly, with age they become more expensive to run, some need repairs some need retrofits, for some even routine refueling may no longer make economic sense.
The consequences of serious nuclear accidents are too large to insure, and governments have colluded through legal conventions to stop victims from suing for compensation. Serious accidents are also more frequent that is usually admitted; there was about one core-melt incident every 5 years since the accident in Chalk River, Ontario, in 1952.
The New York Times Editorial Board asks the nation to "extend and pretend", extend operations and pretend it makes economic sense. It also asks the world to "delay and pray", to delay true reckoning of the risks of nuclear power, and pray that no more serious accidents will happen.
Sunday, April 27, 2014
Donald Tusk of Poland, sadly, has 2 fatal flaws in his argument for a European Energy Union
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April 27 8:41am |
Permalink
Donald Tusk of Poland, sadly, has 2 fatal flaws in his argument for a European Energy Union published in the Financial Times:
First, there is no sustainable extraction and use of fossil energies. His equation of coal with energy security is logically wrong, myopic, and reveals his strong bias. Measures Poland has taken to protect the interests of her coal industry, such as keeping cheaper renewable power from entering Poland by installing phase-shifters on the borders, are in violation of the European single market.
Second, Donald Tusk fails to mention, and possibly does not understand, the degree of integration already achieved by the European Union on energy matters. The single-market and competition disciplines alone would be sufficient to break the clauses in gas contracts that prohibit the subsequent sale of gas to entities or regions without the consent of the original supplier, Russia. Such clauses are anti-competitive, and the matter could be cleared up under existing EU law.
Sadly, the good points of his argument are thus fully discredited, and he has disqualified himself as a leader of Europe‘s search for stronger cooperation over energy and the response to Russia's aggression.
There is a better way to proceed, one that can be started immediately, as it does not require changes in EU policy and law, or the creation of a new European institution: Understand that gas is important not so much for the energy it carries but primarily for its versatility and flexibility. Then, focus on linking the electricity and gas systems more and make them more flexible through storage and economic incentives in a smart grid. I have sketched it in my blog post "European Energy Policy after the Crimean Crisis: Focus on Flexibility" here:
http://raandreaskr...after-crimean.html
Donald Tusk of Poland, sadly, has 2 fatal flaws in his argument for a European Energy Union published in the Financial Times:
First, there is no sustainable extraction and use of fossil energies. His equation of coal with energy security is logically wrong, myopic, and reveals his strong bias. Measures Poland has taken to protect the interests of her coal industry, such as keeping cheaper renewable power from entering Poland by installing phase-shifters on the borders, are in violation of the European single market.
Second, Donald Tusk fails to mention, and possibly does not understand, the degree of integration already achieved by the European Union on energy matters. The single-market and competition disciplines alone would be sufficient to break the clauses in gas contracts that prohibit the subsequent sale of gas to entities or regions without the consent of the original supplier, Russia. Such clauses are anti-competitive, and the matter could be cleared up under existing EU law.
Sadly, the good points of his argument are thus fully discredited, and he has disqualified himself as a leader of Europe‘s search for stronger cooperation over energy and the response to Russia's aggression.
There is a better way to proceed, one that can be started immediately, as it does not require changes in EU policy and law, or the creation of a new European institution: Understand that gas is important not so much for the energy it carries but primarily for its versatility and flexibility. Then, focus on linking the electricity and gas systems more and make them more flexible through storage and economic incentives in a smart grid. I have sketched it in my blog post "European Energy Policy after the Crimean Crisis: Focus on Flexibility" here:
http://raandreaskr...after-crimean.html
Friday, March 21, 2014
European Energy Policy after the Crimean Crisis: Focus on Flexibility
With Russia‘s taking of Ukrainian territory in a way reminiscent of the times before the 1648 Peace of Westphalia set the current order in international relations, the focus in Europe is shifting from admonishing Russia for its behavior towards diplomatic and economic sanctions. The "dependence of Europe on Russian gas" is moving into focus, and Europe is contemplating how to live with little or no Russian gas. Russia exports fossil energies: coal, oil, and gas; but gas dominates discussions; for background, see http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=rs).
In the wider picture, the following changes are likely:
In Germany, the prospect of lower gas supplies from Russia has already resulted in calls to reconsider the nuclear phase-out. That was to be expected from the nuclear die-hards, but their arguments are nonsense: Nuclear power and gas occupy very different parts of the energy market and -- with very few exceptions -- cannot substitute one another. Nevertheless, European utilities and policy-makers will not focus on the costs and risks of nuclear power as much as their attention is drawn towards gas.
Reflexive Focus on Gas
Europe will develop responses in the gas market, and in its policies on energy transition. The short to medium-term response in the gas market can be to:
The impact on energy transformation policies can be significant. Policies needed for reducing dependence on gas have not been in focus so far, but they are essentially the same as for phasing out nuclear and coal power. The EU and the Member States might accelerate the rollout of policies modeled on Germany‘s Energiewende. (It is worth noting that Germany is not a leader here, neither in technologies across the board, nor in terms of growth or market share of renewable energies. Yet, Germany is seen as the trailblazer in the development of effective policy frameworks.)
From Gas to Flexibility …
So far, gas has been billed as a "friend of renewable energies" because gas-fired power plants can ramp up and down quite quickly and thus compensate for the predictable fluctuation in the supply of some renewable energies, notably wind and solar energy. (Others, such as biogas-to-power are dispatchable, as is a part of hydropower.) Together, renewable energies and gas could displace nuclear and coal power more effectively, more economically and quicker than either could without the other. With gas as the "flexible friend" of renewable energies taking a smaller role, the flexibility will have to come from 1) storage and 2) demand response:
… through Storage and …
The more storage in the system the easier it can evolve to 100% renewable energy. Put simply, storage comes as:
… Demand Response
Demand response has not been used much in any of the EU Member States; the current energy grids and regulatory frameworks are "hard wired" against it. Yet the potential is enormous when you consider the ease with which power demand can be shifted by a few hours or days.
Trimet, a German aluminum recycler, has developed the skill of ramping its processes up and down so as to "surf the weather systems bringing cheap wind power to Germany". It has become a "swing consumer" of electricity with a business model that has allowed it to push a Dutch rival company into bankruptcy. The process innovation could be replicated in other industries, notably steel and chemicals.
For households and small businesses, electricity tariffs giving real-time incentives depending on the grid load and supply, could stimulate sufficient flexibility to compensate the loss of gas in the system. But that requires changes in the tariff and taxation policies: Taxes (and charges) must be expressed in percentages of the basic (market) price rather than as fixed amounts expressed in Euro cents per kWh as is currently the case. (Tariffs must stop muffling the price signals and rather amplify them.)
Hope from the Ukraine
With the right narrative and conceptual framework, and with principled and forward-looking policies adopted by the European Union and its Member States, the Crimean Crisis might hasten the transformation of Europe‘s energy systems towards 100% renewable supplies in a smart grid, a system that stimulates and provides for dynamic efficiency with many economic and social benefits. This hope does not belittle or excuse anything Russia is doing in its neighborhood, but Europe should still make the best of a bad situation.
In the wider picture, the following changes are likely:
- The little coal Russia exports will simply go elsewhere; the world market geometry will adapt. Total cost will go up slightly because of "dislocation" from the current market equilibrium. No great impact,
- Oil will be redirected in part, as far as possible given the pipeline and shipping infrastructures in place. In the short and medium term, expect lower exports from Russia, slightly higher world market prices. Over the long term, as additional infrastructure may be built, more oil might flow East and South from Russia; Russia will want to reduce its dependence on the European market and develop its markets in Asia.
- Gas is the most interesting, because it is largely pipeline-bound. (Russia has increased export of LNG notably to Japan, and this may increase in importance.) In the short run, expect significantly lower gas exports from and revenues going to Russia. This will cause some general economic dislocation in Russia as well as more limited adjustments in the European energy systems.
In Germany, the prospect of lower gas supplies from Russia has already resulted in calls to reconsider the nuclear phase-out. That was to be expected from the nuclear die-hards, but their arguments are nonsense: Nuclear power and gas occupy very different parts of the energy market and -- with very few exceptions -- cannot substitute one another. Nevertheless, European utilities and policy-makers will not focus on the costs and risks of nuclear power as much as their attention is drawn towards gas.
Reflexive Focus on Gas
Europe will develop responses in the gas market, and in its policies on energy transition. The short to medium-term response in the gas market can be to:
- Use strategic reserves to cushion market effects and avoid panic, and prepare to change gas flow directions to provide "Western" gas to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics;
- Expand supplies from indigenous sources, but that is limited;
- Import more gas from Norway (as first choice) and other neighbors, notably Algeria (second choice, because of Abdelaziz Bouteflika‘s regime and Russia‘s role in the Algerian gas industry);
- Save gas; use it more efficiently, and substitute gas with (renewable) power wherever and whenever possible (which requires marginal retrofits in many gas-using installations);
- Build up the biogas industry (which has limited potential but still some room to grow);
- Try to frack Europe while events in the Ukraine may muffle opposition to fracking for fossil methane for a while, even if it is a deviation and distraction from rational energy policy;
- Invest in power-to-gas conversion as a domestic source of synthesized gas.
The impact on energy transformation policies can be significant. Policies needed for reducing dependence on gas have not been in focus so far, but they are essentially the same as for phasing out nuclear and coal power. The EU and the Member States might accelerate the rollout of policies modeled on Germany‘s Energiewende. (It is worth noting that Germany is not a leader here, neither in technologies across the board, nor in terms of growth or market share of renewable energies. Yet, Germany is seen as the trailblazer in the development of effective policy frameworks.)
From Gas to Flexibility …
So far, gas has been billed as a "friend of renewable energies" because gas-fired power plants can ramp up and down quite quickly and thus compensate for the predictable fluctuation in the supply of some renewable energies, notably wind and solar energy. (Others, such as biogas-to-power are dispatchable, as is a part of hydropower.) Together, renewable energies and gas could displace nuclear and coal power more effectively, more economically and quicker than either could without the other. With gas as the "flexible friend" of renewable energies taking a smaller role, the flexibility will have to come from 1) storage and 2) demand response:
… through Storage and …
The more storage in the system the easier it can evolve to 100% renewable energy. Put simply, storage comes as:
- "Pre-power storage" -- for instance of biogas, water head behind hydropower dams (pump and flow), or as heat (in the form of molten metals from concentrated solar energy installations;
- "Power storage" in batteries, for instance in electric vehicles, but utility-scale batteries are also coming onto the market;
- "Interim or side storage" with conversion from power and back to power, such as flywheels, compressed air storage etc.;
- "Post-power storage" -- such as ice (for subsequent cooling) or heat (in hot-water tanks, for instance).
… Demand Response
Demand response has not been used much in any of the EU Member States; the current energy grids and regulatory frameworks are "hard wired" against it. Yet the potential is enormous when you consider the ease with which power demand can be shifted by a few hours or days.
Trimet, a German aluminum recycler, has developed the skill of ramping its processes up and down so as to "surf the weather systems bringing cheap wind power to Germany". It has become a "swing consumer" of electricity with a business model that has allowed it to push a Dutch rival company into bankruptcy. The process innovation could be replicated in other industries, notably steel and chemicals.
For households and small businesses, electricity tariffs giving real-time incentives depending on the grid load and supply, could stimulate sufficient flexibility to compensate the loss of gas in the system. But that requires changes in the tariff and taxation policies: Taxes (and charges) must be expressed in percentages of the basic (market) price rather than as fixed amounts expressed in Euro cents per kWh as is currently the case. (Tariffs must stop muffling the price signals and rather amplify them.)
Hope from the Ukraine
With the right narrative and conceptual framework, and with principled and forward-looking policies adopted by the European Union and its Member States, the Crimean Crisis might hasten the transformation of Europe‘s energy systems towards 100% renewable supplies in a smart grid, a system that stimulates and provides for dynamic efficiency with many economic and social benefits. This hope does not belittle or excuse anything Russia is doing in its neighborhood, but Europe should still make the best of a bad situation.
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